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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 910017 
v. : 
ROBERT P. HAGEN, : Category No. 14 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that 
this Court could not reach a decision in State v. Perank. No. 
860196, a pending case, contrary to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of 
Utah. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied. 479 
U.S. 994 (1986), that would have any practical effect? 
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction 
of error" standard of review applies, and this Court gives no 
deference to the court of appeals' legal conclusion. Citv of 
Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 536 (Utah), cert, 
denied. Ill S. Ct. 120 (1990); Provo Citv Corporation v. Willden. 
768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the court of appeals erroneously refuse to 
remand defendant's case to the trial court for reconsideration of 
the jurisdictional question under a correct allocation of proof 
and a proper standard of proof? 
The standard of review noted in paragraph 1 applies 
here, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert P. Hagen, was charged with 
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 1). Pursuant to a plea 
bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge (R. 33, 36-43). 
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment 
and to withdraw his guilty plea, challenging the court's 
jurisdiction on the basis that he was an Indian who had allegedly 
committed a crime in Indian country and thus was subject to 
federal court jurisdiction only (R. 53-58). After an evidentiary 
hearing, the court denied defendant's motion, sentenced him to a 
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, and ordered 
him to pay various fines and restitution (R. 61, 63-64; T. 25-
26). 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed defendant's 
conviction and ordered him discharged, concluding that (1) under 
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Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), Myton, Utah is 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation, and that the Utah Supreme Court could not reach a 
contrary decision in State v. Perank, No. 860196, a pending case; 
(2) the trial court had applied an incorrect burden and standard 
of proof in ruling that defendant was not an Indian for 
jurisdictional purposes; and (3) remand to the trial court for a 
determination of defendant's Indian status under a correct 
allocation of the burden of proof and a proper standard of proof 
was not appropriate. State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1991). 
On January 22, 1991, the State filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari in this Court. On April 23, 1991, that 
petition was granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts are not in dispute. Defendant 
pleaded guilty to distribution of marijuana, which occurred in 
Myton, Utah. 
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to arrest 
judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant presented the 
following evidence in an effort to establish that he was an 
Indian for purposes of avoiding state criminal jurisdiction: 
(1) defendant had lived on Indian reservations all his life, 
attending their schools and using their hospitals (T. 4); (2) he 
had lived on the Uintah Indian Reservation for the past six or 
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seven years, attending some of the Ute Tribe's business meetings 
and nearly all of their pow wows (T. 5-6); (3) although he is not 
a member of the Ute Tribe, he is a member of the Little Shell 
Tribe of the Chippewa Indians, a tribe which is not recognized by 
the federal government (T. 7; Def. Ex. 3 & 4); (4) he had 
received money distributed from a fund administered by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) — a fund which had been created pursuant 
to a money judgment won by various bands of the Pembina Chippewa 
Indians (T. 6-8; Def. Ex. 2); (5) he had received free health 
care from the Indian Health Service (IHS) his entire life (T. 
10); and (6) that he had 5/16ths Indian blood (T. 11). 
In a brief cross-examination of defendant, the 
prosecutor established that defendant had no Ute Indian blood; 
that his mother, although an Indian, was not an enrolled member 
of any tribe; that his father was not an Indian; that he had a 
grandmother who was an Indian and a grandfather who was half-
Indian; and that he recieved no benefits in Utah other than the 
free health care from IHS1 (T. 11-13). The State presented no 
independent evidence. 
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion. Avoiding the question of wheth€*r Myton, Utah 
is within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah Indian 
Reservation, the court determined that defendant is not an 
1
 Defendant qualified this by indicating he also was 
receiving money from the BIA every year (T. 13). 
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Indian. It stated: 
The court does not meet the question of 
reservation status because the court finds 
that the defendant is not an Indian under any 
definition which the court believes can be 
reasonably applied in this case. . . . The 
court finds that in fact there is a great 
diversity of definitions of what constitutes 
the status of an Indian. Because of the 
great diversity and because there needs to be 
at least some reasonable uniformity in the 
establishment of that, the court finds that 
the standard applied by the Codes of Federal 
Regulations and by the Ute Indian Tribe in 
defining that as an enrolled member of a 
federally recognized tribe is an appropriate 
one. 
The court does not base it on that 
determination alone, but I do believe that in 
order for there to be some variation from 
that we must have at least clear and 
convincing evidence. Not just preponderance. 
There must be substantial evidence shown that 
there is a reason to vary from that 
definition, and the court finds that has not 
been shown in this case. 
(T. 25-26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erroneously concluded that this 
Court could not reach a decision in State v. Perank, No. 860196, 
a pending case, contrary to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
994 (1986), that would have any practical effect. That 
conclusion is contrary to the clear import of a number of 
decisions from other jurisdictions, including the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' holding on this point and resolve the issue of whether 
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Myton, Utah is within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah 
Indian Reservation in conjunction with the Court's resolution of 
the identical issue in Perank. If the Court were to conclude in 
Perank that Myton is not within the reservation, there would be 
no question the trial court had jurisdiction over defendant. 
As to the specific issue of whether Ute Indian Tribe 
correctly concluded that Myton is within the confines of the 
reservation, this Court should consider the State's argionents in 
Perank in light of the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990). That decision, 
as opposed to Ute Indian Tribe, applies the correct test for 
disestablishment and follows an analysis nearly identical to that 
used by the State in Perank in its argument that Myton is not 
within the reservation. 
Finally, the court of appeals erroneously held that 
defendant's case must be dismissed on the ground that the State 
failed to establish jurisdiction by carrying its burden of 
proving that defendant is not an Indian. Because jurisdiction is 
not an element of the crime, remand for reconsideration of the 
Indian status question under a correct allocation of the burden 
of proof and a proper standard of proof would not offend double 
jeopardy principles. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the 
court of appeals' holding that remand was prohibited and, if 
resolution of the Perank issue so requires, remand the case for 
reconsideration of the Indian status/jurisdiction issue. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THIS COURT COULD NOT REACH A DECISION IN 
STATE V. PERANK, NO. 860196, A PENDING CASE, 
CONTRARY TO UTE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF 
UTAH, 773 F.2D 1087 (10TH CIR. 1985) (EN 
BANC), CERT. DENIED, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), 
THAT WOULD HAVE ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT. 
A. Court of Appeals' View of Federal Precedent 
In the trial court the State argued as one alternative 
basis for jurisdiction in state court that Myton, Utah is not 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation 
(T. 18). In ruling that it had jurisdiction over defendant, the 
trial court did not address that question, basing its decision 
solely on its determination that defendant was not an Indian (T. 
25). 
In the court of appeals, the State acknowledged that in 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that Myton is within the exterior 
boundaries of the reservation. However, it informed the court 
that whether Myton is actually within the confines of the 
reservation is an issue pending before this Court in State v. 
Perank, No. 860196, and suggested that, "since the decision in 
Perank has the potential of mooting the jurisdictional issue, it 
[might] be wise for the Court to wait for that decision before 
issuing an opinion in the instant case." Br. of Appellee at 5. 
Without citing to any authority, the court of appeals summarily 
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rejected the State's suggestion, concluding: 
The Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear 
to hold open any role for the state courts in 
refining its holding in Ute Indian Tribe. 
While we have not been acquainted with the 
precise arguments advanced by the state in 
Perank, we are hard-pressed to see how, given 
the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, our state courts could 
reach a contrary decision that would have any 
practical effect. Seeing no possibility of 
an effective decision in Perank contrary to 
the result in Ute Indian Tribe, we see no 
reason to await the Perank decision, 
especially since defendant is presently 
incarcerated. 
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747. 
This conclusion is contrary to the clear import of a 
number of decisions from other jurisdictions — i.e.,, this Court 
is entitled to its own view on reservation status. See, e.g., 
State v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982); compare Stankev v. 
Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977), with United States v. Long 
Elk, 565 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1977). Indeed, certiorari was 
granted by the United States Supreme Court in both DeCoteau v. 
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1975), and Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), because the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota had reached a different result than had the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals on whether a reservation had been 
disestablished. Neither of those cases suggests that the state 
court was not free to disagree with the federal court on the 
reservation issue. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' holding that the Utah appellate courts are bound by Ute 
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Indian Tribe, and resolve the issue of whether Myton is within 
the reservation's exterior boundaries in conjunction with the 
Court's resolution of the identical issue in Perank. As the 
State argued in the court of appeals, if this Court were to 
conclude in Perank that Myton is not within the reservation, 
there would be no question the trial court had criminal 
jurisdiction over defendant. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 
411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 
449, 459 (7th Cir.) (state court has jurisdiction to punish an 
Indian who commits a crime off the reservation and within state 
territory), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984). 
B. Additional Argument on Disestablishment Question 
In Perank, the State has fully argued its position that 
Ute Indian Tribe was wrongly decided and that the original Uintah 
Reservation was disestablished and today consists of only 
tribally owned "trust lands," of which the town of Myton is not a 
part. Br. of Respondent at 17-48 (a copy of this portion of the 
State's brief is attached as an appendix). Because the Court is 
aware of the State's position on the issue, the arguments 
advanced in Perank will not be repeated here but are simply 
incorporated by reference. However, after Ute Indian Tribe was 
issued and after Perank was submitted to the Court for decision, 
the Tenth Circuit decided another reservation disestablishment 
case, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company v. Yazzie. 909 F.2d 
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1387 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990)2, which 
deserves brief discussion. 
Yazzie represents a retreat by the Tenth Circuit from 
the basic rationale employed in Ute Indian Tribe. Further, 
Yazzie supports the State's position in Perank that the en banc 
panel in Ute Indian Tribe used an erroneous analysis in reaching 
its decision. The Yazzie panel, unlike the Ute Indian Tribe 
panel, followed the correct legal test for determining whether or 
not an Indian reservation has been diminished. In Perank, the 
State argued that the United States Supreme Court had delineated 
a clear test in Solem v. Bartlett and preceding cases (see 
discussion in Br. of Resp. at 17-27). The State also pointed out 
why Ute Indian Tribe had erroneously perceived Solemt as setting 
forth a new test, which it did not. Unlike Ute Indian Tribe, 
Yazzie adopts virtually the same analytical test the State has 
urged this Court to follow in Perank. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 
1389, 1393, 1395-96. Thus, this latest decision from the Tenth 
Circuit confirms the State's reading of Solem for the test to be 
applied in determining whether reservation boundaries have been 
diminished, which includes an examination of subsequent 
legislative and executive treatment and demographics. In fact, 
the analysis and organization used in Yazzie is very similar to 
2
 On August 8, 1990, the State brought this case to the 
Court's attention in a letter of supplemental authority filed 
pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
submitted the Tenth Circuit's slip opinion. Since then, the 
opinion was amended slightly and is reported in amended form at 
the citation noted. 
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that used by the State in Perank. Regardless of how this Court 
decides Perank and the instant case, the decision should be 
reached by using the correct analysis set forth in Solem, and not 
the faulty analysis used in Ute Indian Tribe. 
As opposed to Ute Indian Tribe, Yazzie gives the proper 
emphasis to the "restored to the public domain" language used in 
the specific legislation opening a reservation to entry. In 
Perank, the State argued that the Act of 1902 (32 Stat. 245), 
which began the disestablishment process on the Uintah 
Reservation, clearly stated that the surplus lands were to be 
restored to the public domain. That statement appeared in the 
operative section of the 1902 Act. Under Solem and its 
predecessor cases, the phrase "restored to the public domain" was 
very strong evidence of a congressional intent to disestablish a 
reservation (see discussion in Perank, Br. of Resp. at 18-26). 
Ute Indian Tribe viewed Solem as a retreat from this long-
standing principle of construction. Yazzie, on the other hand, 
correctly reads Solem and gives "restored to the public domain" 
its proper consideration as an important part of the analytical 
test. See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1397-1405. 
Indeed, the Yazzie panel was critical of Ute Indian 
Tribe's treatment of the "public domain" language: 
Our conclusion in Ute that the generic phrase 
["restore to the public domain"] was 
ambiguous is undercut . . . by our 
conflicting statement earlier in the same 
opinion that public domain language implies 
"a wholesale diminishment of the 
Reservation." Moreoverf our conclusion is 
unexamined and unsupported in the opinion. 
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909 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis added)• In short, Yazzie supports the 
State's argument in Perank that the "restored to the public 
domain" language in the 1902 Act is a strong indication of a 
congressional intent to diminish the reservation. 
Finally, while the general analytical test and result 
in Yazzie are correct, the court's rationale in distinguishing 
Ute Indian Tribe is not. See 909 F.2d at 1399-1400. The en banc 
panel in Ute Indian Tribe simply misread Solem and totally 
discounted the public domain language in the 1902 Act. Yazzie 
distinguishes Ute Indian Tribe on the ground that the "restored 
to the public domain" language was not included in the subsequent 
1905 Act (33 Stat. 1048). However, the 1902 Act — not the 1905 
Act — established Congress's baseline intent to diminish the 
Uintah Reservation (see Perank. Br. of Resp. at 33-38). 
The issue is whether the 1902 Act or the 1905 Act was 
the operative legislation opening the Uintah Reservation. The 
1905 Act did not purport to change whether there would be a 
disestablishment. Congress's baseline intent that the unallotted 
lands were to be restored to the public domain was clearly stated 
in the 1902 Act. The 1905 Act merely addressed the manner and 
procedures for accomplishing disestablishment. See Rosebud Sioux 
Indian Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (see discussion in 
Perank, Br. of Resp. at 33-37). This conclusion is further 
buttressed by the clear statement in the Presidential 
Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119) that the Uintah 
Reservation was opened pursuant to the 1902 Act (see Perank, Br. 
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of Resp. at 36-37)• This was the position asserted by the 
original Tenth Circuit panel in Ute Indian Tribe (716 F.2d 1298 
(10th Cir. 1983)) and by the dissent in the en banc opinion on 
rehearing (773 F.2d at 1101-16 (Sethf J., dissenting)). This 
Court should consider Judge Seth's discussion of the 1902 and 
1905 Acts in those opinions. 
In sum, because the Uintah Reservation was 
disestablished by the 1902 Act, the site of defendant's crime was 
not within Indian country, and the state district court therefore 
had jurisdiction. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO 
REMAND DEFENDANT'S CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL 
ISSUE UNDER A CORRECT ALLOCATION OF THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND A PROPER STANDARD OF 
PROOF. 
In the court of appeals, the State conceded that the 
trial court had incorrectly placed the burden on defendant to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was an Indian, 
acknowledging that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1990)3, 
the State had the ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction (i.e., 
that defendant was not an Indian) by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Haaen, 802 P.2d at 746-47; Br. of Appellee at 5-9. 
Although the court of appeals did not note it, the State cited 
3
 Section 76-1-501(3) provides: 
The existence of jurisdiction and venue 
are not elements of the offense but shall be 
established by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
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the position it had taken in Perank on this issue: A defendant 
who challenges the court's jurisdiction on the ground that he or 
she is an Indian carries the initial burden of producing prima 
facie evidence to establish Indian status; and the defendant must 
produce evidence, beyond mere suppositions or allegations, to 
raise a jurisdictional question. See United States v. Hester, 
719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). Once that threshold showing 
is made, the burden shifts to the state, and it must carry the 
ultimate burden of persuasion on jurisdiction. Ibid.A 
The State then requested that defendant's case be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of defendant's 
Indian status under a correct allocation of proof and a proper 
standard of proof. Ibid. This request was premised on the fact 
that both the trial court and the prosecutor had proceeded under 
a misinterpretation of the law in an area that had not yet been 
settled by a Utah appellate court (i.e., what burden and standard 
of proof applied to the Indian status question for purposes of 
state criminal jurisdiction). Furthermore, the question of 
Indian status for jurisdictional purposes is a question of fact 
which is most appropriately determined by the trial court. See 
A
 Although a number of courts have adopted a contrary view 
of which party carries the ultimate burden of proof, see, e.g., 
State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 384, 563 A.2d 249, 253 (1989) (the 
defendant bears the burden of proving Indian status by a 
preponderance of the evidence); Jones v. State, 94 Nev. 679, 680, 
585 P.2d 1340, 1341 (1978) ("the accused must shoulder the burden 
of establishing his Indian ancestry if he seeks to challenge 
state court jurisdiction), the State's position in Perank finds 
considerable support in the case law and is consistent with the 
plain language of section 76-1-501(3). 
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United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d at 457 (Indian status for 
jurisdiction is a question of fact on which the government 
carries the burden)5. 
5
 In light of the court of appeals' holding that Ute Indian 
Tribe required it to consider Myton as being within the 
reservation, the Indian status question was critical to the 
jurisdictional issue. 
Under federal law, states may assume jurisdiction over 
Indian lands with the consent of the Indian tribes. See 25 
U.S.C. §§1321(a), 1322(a). Although Utah statutory law provides 
for the assumption of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-36-201 
to -213 (Supp. 1991), no Indian tribe has consented to state 
jurisdiction. United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1508 n.7 
(10th Cir. 1985) . 
Therefore, the general rules of criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians and Indian land apply. "Determining which sovereign or 
sovereigns have jurisdiction turns on a two-step inquiry: 1) 
where the offense took place; and 2) whether the defendant or 
victim was Indian or non-Indian." St. Cloud v. United States, 
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (D.S.D. 1988). In the instant case, 
assuming that Myton is part of the reservation, the central 
question is whether defendant is an Indian, such that the state 
court would not have jurisdiction over him for the drug crime he 
allegedly committed in Indian country. If defendant is an 
Indian, the federal government appears to have exclusive 
jurisdiction to prosecute him for the alleged offense. See 
United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (federal 
district court has jurisdiction over Indian defendant accused of 
distribution of marijuana and possession with intent to 
distribute hashish, in violation of federal statute); People v. 
Luna. 683 P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1984) (state lacked jurisdiction 
to prosecute Indian defendants for alleged sale and distribution 
of controlled substances in Indian country). See also State v. 
St. Francis, 151 Vt. 384, 563 A.2d 249, 251 (1989) ("If 
defendants are 'Indians' and the crimes were committed in 'Indian 
country,' then Vermont has no jurisdiction over defendants."). 
If defendant is not an Indian, it appears that the state 
court would have jurisdiction. See State v. Snvder, 119 Idaho 
376, 807 P.2d 55 (1991) (a non-Indian motorist's driving under 
the influence of alcohol on a road within the boundaries of the 
reservation was not a crime against an Indian or the general 
Indian populace, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the 
state); State v. Herber. 123 Ariz. 214, 598 P.2d 1033 (1979) 
(state court conviction of non-Indian for possession of marijuana 
on an Indian reservation upheld); State v. Jones, 92 Nev. 116, 
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The court of appeals rejected the State's request for a 
remand on the grounds that, given the evidence developed in the 
trial court, the State simply could not carry its burden of 
establishing jurisdiction "in the absence of any evidence 
establishing jurisdiction," and that the State is not "entitled 
to a second chance to put on evidence addressed to the 
jurisdictional issue." Hagen, 802 P.2d at 748. On the latter 
point, the court stated that "[w]hen reversal results from the 
failure of the state to prove jurisdiction, further trial 
proceedings are not in order[;] [o]n the contrary, the conviction 
is reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged." Ibid. 
(citing State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)). This suggests that the court of appeals considered 
further proceedings to be barred on double jeopardy grounds. 
However, such a conclusion is contrary to the better view adopted 
in many jurisdictions that double jeopardy is not a bar to 
further proceedings when there has been a failure to establish 
jurisdiction in an initial prosecution. See, e.g., State v. 
Miller, 47 Ohio App.3d 113, 547 N.E.2d 399 (1988); State v. Love, 
546 P.2d 235 (1976) (reversing district court's dismissal of 
charges against a non-Indian for possession of marijuana on an 
Indian reservation). This would hold unless it were shown that 
defendant's distribution of a controlled substance was a crime 
against an Indian. See Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th 
Cir. 1990) ("state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is 
limited to crimes committed 'by non-Indians against non-Indians 
. • . and victimless crimes by non-Indians'") (quoting Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984)); State v. Larson, 455 
N.W.2d 600 (S.D. 1990) (state did not have jurisdiction to 
prosecute a simple assault committed in Indian country by non-
Indian against an Indian). 
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5 Kan.App.2d 768, 625 P.2d 7 (1981); State v. Russo, 70 Wis.2d 
169, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975). It is also contrary to the plain 
language of section 76-1-501(3) which explicitly states that the 
existence of jurisdiction is not an element of the crime. 
Illustrative of the view that a remand for 
reconsideration of the jurisdictional question would not offend 
double jeopardy principles is State v. Hutcherson, 790 S.W.2d 532 
(Tenn. 1990). There, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed an 
intermediate appellate court decision which had reversed the 
defendant's conviction and dismissed the case because the state 
had failed to prove venue and jurisdiction. In holding that the 
lower appellate court had correctly concluded that the state 
failed to establish venue but had erroneously dismissed the case, 
the supreme court emphasized that failure to prove venue is a 
procedural error and is not tantamount to a failure to present 
sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime charged. 
790 S.W.2d at 534-35. Noting that, consistent with double 
jeopardy principles, a finding of procedural error may result in 
a remand for a new trial while the finding of insufficient 
evidence to prove the crime cannot, the court stated: 
It seems that the basic distinction is 
whether the defect that requires reversal 
involved the guilt or innocence of defendant. 
Proof of venue is necessary to establish the 
jurisdiction of the court, but it is not an 
element of any offense and need only be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Venue has nothing whatever to do with the 
guilt or innocence of a defendant. . . . 
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
preclude retrying a defendant whose 
conviction is set aside because of an error 
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in the proceedings. We are of the opinion 
that failure to establish venue is in that 
category and retrial does not violate that 
constitutional command. 
790 S.W.2d at 535 (emphasis in original). 
Based on the reasoning of Hutcherson, this Court should 
reverse the court of appeals' holding that remand was prohibited 
and, if the resolution of the Perank issue so requires, remand 
the case for reconsideration of the Indian status cjuestion under 
a correct allocation of the burden of proof and a proper standard 
of proof, and in light of whatever additional evidence is 
presented by the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
reverse the court of appeals' holding that this Court is bound by 
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ute Indian Tribe and that the 
case could not be remanded for reconsideration of defendant's 
Indian status. Furthermore, the Court should decide the 
reservation issue in conjunction with deciding Perank, with 
particular attention paid to Yazzie, which provides significant 
additional support for the State's argument in Perank that Myton, 
Utah is not within the reservation.
 id 
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Basin. And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be 
said that Perank•* status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections 
1152 and 1153 was not established below. 
ARGUMENT 
X. THE OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY 
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
Perank claims his crime was committed within Indian country 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allega-
tion that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of 
jurisdiction. The following section of this brief will demon-
strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country 
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished 
and today consists only of ••trust lands,H and Perankfs offense 
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the 
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for 
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished. This 
is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and 
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation 
which show that it has been disestablished. 
A. General Principles Governing Disestablishment 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263), 
as amended, a Presidential Proclamation issued on July 14, 1905 
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved 
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the 
public domain and opened for public settlement under the home-
stead and townsite laws. It is settled law that some surplus 
land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
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v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), and DeCoteau v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and other surplus land acts did not, 
see, e.g,t Mattz v, Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), and Seymour v, 
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69. 
As explained in Solem, the Supreme Court has established a "fair-
ly clean analytical structure91 for distinguishing those surplus 
land acts that of their own force effected an immediate diminish-
ment of the reservation from those acts that simply permitted 
non-Indians to purchase land within an existing reservation and 
left to another day the actual redrawing of its boundaries (id. 
at 470). Because Appellant does no more than submit the decision 
of the en banc majority to support his contention that the crime 
took place in Indian country, we must examine that decision in 
light of controlling Supreme Court precedents. 
1. The en banc majorityfs decision in Ute Indian Tribe that 
the historic reservations were not disestablished ultimately 
rests on the proposition that restoration to public domain lan-
guage is not the same as a congressional state of mind to dises-
tablish and does not reliably establish the clear and unequivocal 
evidence of Congress9 intent to change boundaries. In so hold-
ing, the majority acknowledged that this had not been the law 
prior to Solem and, indeed, all of the judges who had considered 
this case before Solem agreed that such language was synonymous 
with disestablishment. See Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1303 
(panel opinion); id^ at 1316 (Doyle, J., dissenting); and 521 
F.Supp. at 1122 (district court opinion). To the en banc major-
ity, however, Solem altered this long-standing principle of 
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interpretation and marked a new direction in the Supreme Courtfs 
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reser-
vations. Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u]nder the 
Solem standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the 
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any 
of the congressional enactments in question11. Ute Indian Tribe, 
773 F.2d at 1090-91. 
The majority's reading of Solem is not correct. Solem did 
not establish new "standards91 and it did not alter the principles 
announced in Seymourf Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud, which the 
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean 
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts 
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered 
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established 
reservation boundaries.19 465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court 
has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of 
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of 
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the 
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately 
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 & n.l2)# the 
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that con-
gressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586, and 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71). 
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must 
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation. 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. In each of the disestablishment cases 
decided before Solem, the Court expressly acknowledged that res-
toration to public domain constitutes firm and unequivocal lan-
guage of disestablishment. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589 & n.5; 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 446; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504, n.22; 
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-55; and United States v. Pelican, 232 
U.S. 442, 445-46 (1914). In the clearest possible terms, the 
Court stated that restoration to the public domain meant 
••stripped of reservation status." DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446. 
The decisions in Rosebud and Decoteau fairly reflect the view 
of the Court on this point. Although in both cases the Court was 
divided on the question whether the particular area involved had 
retained reservation status, the Court was unanimous that such 
restoration language amounted to a unequivocal expression of an 
intent to disestablish. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, n.5; id, 
at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 
446; id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice 
Marshall—who wrote the Court1 s opinion in Solem—observed in his 
dissenting opinion in Rosebud that an 1889 surplus land act ex-
pressly restoring lands to the public domain (25 Stat. 896, sec. 
21) was ••yet another example* of "•clear language of express ter-
mination. . .f." Id^, 430 U.S. at 618. 
Solem did not reject or alter this firmly-established rule of 
interpretation. The crucial provision interpreted in Solem did 
not provide for the restoration of the surplus lands to the 
public domain, nor was any such language contained in the opera-
tive portions of the Solem legislation. Instead, a reference to 
"public domain" appeared in a subsequent section providing that 
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tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the 
opened lands, "only as long as the land remained part of the 
public domain." Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged 
that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablish-
ment; it found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated," 
it could not be dispositive. Solem, 465 U.S. at 475. 
In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en 
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that 
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in 
using..." public domain terminology in the Solem legislation 
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the 
'public domain* inasmuch as they were available for settlement11 
(id., 465 U.S. at 475, n.17). It is evident, however, that the 
Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its 
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain 
language in every other instance. The Court had already indi-
cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim 
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its com-
ments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a dras-
tic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and 
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of 
such restoration language. 
The en banc majority's decision to the contrary also over-
looks the Solem Court1s later observation, in the context of 
subsequent jurisdictional history, that: 
Unentered lands were considered a part of the 
reservation. They were available for allotment to 
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of 
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the tribe# and they were specifically defined as 
different from land in public domain* 
Id. at 480, n.25 (emphasis added), quoting F. Hoxie, Jurisdiction 
on the Cheyenne River Reservation: An Analysis of the Causes and 
Consequences of the Act of May 29, 1908f at 87 (undated). The 
reference to public domain in the quoted passage can only be 
understood on the basis that public domain and reservation status 
are mutually exclusive.!§/ In short, Solem does not signal the 
Supreme Court's abandonment of its previous interpretations of 
restoration to public domain language. Such language continues 
to be the clearest expression of disestablishment. 
2. Although Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 3420 (1985),12/ required that the 
various acts involved here—which contain identical operative 
language—should be interpreted to have the same effect, the en 
banc majority did not do so and thereby compounded its error. In 
this regard, there was no dispute that the so-called "Gilsonite 
16. This is how the author of the quoted study understood 
it, as he considered public domain status to be crucial in inter-
preting the subsequent jurisdictional treatment of the area in-
volved. See Hoxie, supra, at 87, 88. Thus, he stated that it 
was necessary to determine whether the area in question was "ad-
ministered as part of the public domain. • . •" Id,,, at 87. 
17. In that case, the issue was whether that Tribe retained 
treaty hunting and fishing rights in an area ceded under a 1901 
cession agreement. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422. In interpreting this 
agreement, the Court initially looked to the construction given a 
prior treaty with the same Tribe containing similar cession lan-
guage. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422, 3428. As the Court there ex-
plained, "[p]resumptively, the similar language used In the 1901 
Cession Agreement should have the same effect.91 105 S.Ct. at 
3428. 
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Strip11—a 7,000-acre tract located on the edge of the original 
Uintah reservation—was disestablished by the Act of May 24, 1888 
(25 Stat. 157)• See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1098 
(Seymour, J., concurring). Compare with district court opinion, 
id., 521 F.Supp. at 1099. See also panel opinion, id,, 716 F.2d 
at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting). As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-
gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in 
the Gilsonite Strip. . . ." Idk, 773 F.2d at 1098. Yet the 
operative provisions concerning the Gilsonite Strip used the same 
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus Land Act and expressly re-
stored the area "to the public domain11 (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157). 
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration lan-
guage contained in the 1902 Uintah Act should be interpreted dif-
ferently, and there is none.li/ 
3. The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds with 
the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment 
cases. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-
sions, have consistently recognized that restoration to public 
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent 
to disestablish.12/ Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior 
18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the under-
standing of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in 
interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute 
Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112. 
19. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90 
(8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); United States ex 
rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973); Beardslee v. United States, 387 
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to Solan had also assumed that such language was synonymous with 
disestablishment.12/ The significance these decisions accorded 
to restoration to public domain language has a sound historical 
foundation and follows veil-established principles regarding 
public lands. See Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106 (Seth, J., 
dissenting). Long before the acts in question here, it was set-
tled law that when the federal government appropriates or reser-
ves a tract for any purpose, such as an Indian reservation, the 
tract is thereby severed from the public domain—that is, it 
loses its status as public land.il/ In 1889, for instance, the 
19. (Cont'd.) F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 1967); DeMarrias v. 
South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963); Russ v. Wilkins, 
624 F.2d 914, 915, 924 & 927-29 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hoffman, J., 
dissenting), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v. 
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir. 
1976). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dako-
ta, 711 F.2d 809, 817 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
1042 (1984); United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 525 F.2d 
120, 124 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); and 
Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1957). 
District court and state court decisions in the disestablish-
ment context have been to the same effect. See, e.g., Russ v. 
Wilkins, 410 F.Supp. 579, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds. 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied? 451 U.S. 908 
(1981); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 344 F.Supp. 
777, 778 (D.S.D. 1972), affjjd, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973); 
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.Supp. 1001, 
1005 (D. Minn. 1971); Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 119 
(S.D. 1977); Wood v. Jameson, 130 N.W.2d 95, 99 (S.D. 1964); and 
Lafferty v. State, 125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 1963). 
20. See Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 
1965); TooTsgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 98, 104 (10th Cir. 
1950) (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 
(1839); Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Co. v. 
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); Hastings and Dakota Rail-
road Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889); Bardon v. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 535, 539 (1892); Spalding 
v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1896); Gibson v. Anderson, 131 
- 24 -
Supreme Court remarked that: 
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and 
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully ap-
propriated to any purpose becomes thereafter sev-
ered from the mass of public lands . • . has been 
reaffirmed and applied by this court in such a 
great number and variety of cases that it may now 
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles 
underlying the land system of this country. 
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co., 132 U.S. at 360-61. Contrary 
to the en banc majority's view, because the reservation of a 
tract removed it from the public domain,21/ later restoration of 
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reser-
vation status.il/ 
In sum, the en banc majority's interpretation not only is 
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the low-
er federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also 
21. (Cont'd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v. 
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1882); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan. 
1881); and United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark. 
1881). "Public domain11 and "public lands11 traditionally have 
been regarded as "equivalent11 concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181 
U.S. 481, 490 (1901). 
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior ex-
plained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation, 
"[a]lthough the • . • reservation had been created out of the 
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status 
of public domain land while included within the reservation. • . 
•" Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950). 
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe 
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by 
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain9 • . 
." by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensa-
tion was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Ex-
ecutive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kap-
pler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . . " Id. at 
330. 
- 25 
is untenable from an historical perspective. At the turn of the 
century, reservation status and public domain status were uni-
formly understood to be mutually exclusive. In construing res-
toration language as it has, the Tenth Circuit has thus attempted 
to "remake history," which the Supreme Court admonished "cannot" 
be done in order to resurrect a reservation that long ago ceased 
to exist. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; accord Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 
615. 
B. The Original Uintah Reservation was Disestablished 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended, 
and Today is Comprised Only of the Trust Lands 
1. Governing Principles Support Disestablishment 
As discussed above, the en banc majority misread 
Solem as changing the Supreme Courtfs analytical test for deter-
mining reservation disestablishment, and failed to apply the 
proper test when considering the legislation which opened the 
Uintah reservation and restored the unallotted lands to the 
pxiblic domain. Restoration to public domain language constitutes 
firm and unequivocal language for disestablishment (DeCoteauf 42 0 
U.S. at 445-46), and demonstrates "an unmistakable baseline pur-
pose of disestablishment" (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 592). 
The analysis of the "public domain" language in the 1902 Act 
as amended by subsequent acts is a key part of the analysis to 
determine whether or not the reservation was disestablished. The 
en banc majority did not consider this legislation In a manner 
consistent with relevant precedents, while the en banc dissent 
followed the correct analytical test and reached the correct 
result. Subsection 2 below is an analysis of the legislation 
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opening the reservation. It clearly shows a congressional intent 
to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and dises-
tablish the reservation. 
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the 
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded 
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under 
Solem but also under the Supreme Court's prior decisions. Sum-
marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem staad that when the 
area involved "has long since lost its Indian character, we have 
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have 
occurred. • . • " 465 U.S. at 471. Thus, "who actually moved 
onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding 
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . .tf Id. 
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as 
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself 
to the teachings of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions. In 
addition to the statutory language, "the •surrounding circum-
stances,9 and the 'legislative history1 are to be examined" in 
interpreting surplus land enactments. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. 
Accord, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 469-70. The record here demon-
strates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors 
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents. Subsection 
3 below reviews these other relevant factors. They vividly dem-
onstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the 
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the 
functioning of State and local governments. 
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We now turn to a specific discussion of the legislation, 
legislative history, demographics and other circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the Uintah reservation. 
2. The Uintah Reservation was Disestablished Pursuant 
to the Act of May 27f 1902y as amended 
a. Creation of the Uintah Reservation 
The Uintah reservation was created by President 
Abraham Lincoln by Executive Order in 1861 and included the en-
tire area within the drainage basin of the Duchesne River, com-
prising approximately 2,039,040 acres (about 3,186 square miles). 
This was later confirmed by Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 63). The 
various bands of the Ute Tribe were encouraged to move to the 
Uintah reservation so they would finally be settled in a desig-
nated area. See Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1092-1100, for 
a discussion of the creation and early history of the Uintah 
reservation. 
b. Early Efforts to Restore Surplus Reservation 
Lands to the Public Domain—The 1902 Act 
The period around the turn of the century wit-
nessed an active effort by Congress and the President to dises-
tablish large Indian reservations by making individual allotments 
to the Indians and then restoring the remaining lands to the 
public domain for settlement. This, Congress hoped,, would 
facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the general society. 
The Uintah reservation was not the only reservation where the 
allotment and surplus program was instigated; it was happening in 
several other reservations in the West at about the same time 
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period. See General Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-
teau at 432-33; and Solem at 466-67. 
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess 
of the lands needed to satisfy the allotments to the Indians. 
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and 
included a provision restoring any lands not allotted to the 
Indians to the public domain. The relevant portion of the Act 
states: 
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the 
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male 
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of 
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable 
by an inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each 
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land 
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land 
to each other member of said tribes, said allot-
ments to be made prior to October first, nineteen 
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted 
lands within said reservation shall be restored to 
the public domain; I I ~. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reser* 
vat ion contained ••public domain11 language which is language "pre-
cisely suited94 to disestablishment. DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446. 
Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneipf 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the 
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation 
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amen-
ded to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated 
•an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment." id. at 
592. See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
An important observation is that, in 1902, Congress believed 
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands 
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could be allotted and the surplus restored to the public domain 
and thus opened to private settlement and entry under the public 
land laws. Efforts to obtain the consent of the Indians to al-
lotment were unsuccessful within the time limits set forth in the 
1902 Act and Congress was forced to take further action with 
regard to opening the Uintah reservation. However, this task was 
made easier by the Supreme Courtfs decision in Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that Congress had ex-
clusive and plenary power to deal with reservation lands, without 
the necessity of obtaining the approval or consent of the 
Indians. 
c. Action After the 1902 Act 
Reacting to the latitude confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Lone Wolf, supra, Congress promptly enacted the Act of 
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982), which directed that the Uintah 
reservation should be allotted and the surplus lands opened for 
settlement and entry under the public land laws.11/ In 1904 Con-
gress again extended the time for the opening to March 10, 1905, 
so that surveying could be completed and allotments made (33 
Stat. 207). 
In the meantime, on April 27, 1903, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs prepared instructions for United States Indian 
Inspector James McLaughlin regarding the opening of the Uintah 
24. It is worthy of note that it took Congress fewer than 
sixty days following the decision of the Supreme Court in Lone 
Wolf in which to mandate the opening of the Uintah reservation 
without the consent of the Indians. 
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reservation. The Department of Interior viewed the administra 
tive task under the 1903 Act to be one of Baking allotments to 
the Indians and restoration of the surplus lands to the public 
domain as set forth in the 1902 Act. In May of 1903, Inspector 
McLaughlin met with the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to 
them that the reservation was to be terminated without their con-
sent and that allotments would be made. The following extract 
from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's 
understanding that the reservation boundaries were to be extin-
guished (JX 162, pg. 42): 
Inspector McLaughlin: 
A number of your speakers have said that you do 
not want your land stolen from you. My friends, 
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all 
remain just as they are. There will be no change 
in the nature of the country but the improvements 
that will come when white people come in among you. 
My friends, Red Cap said my talk was cloudy, and 
you do not understand it. You are the people who 
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act 
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the 
light. You say that line is very heavy and that 
the reservation is nailed down upon the border. 
That is very true as applying to the past many 
years and up to now^ but congress has provided 
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold 
down that line and after next year there will be no 
outside boundary line to this reservation. (Em-
phasis added).ihJ 
d. The Act of March 3f 1905 
The time set by the 1904 Act for opening the 
reservation (March 10, 1905) was running out. Early in 1905, the 
25. For a more detailed version of McLaughlin's negotiations 
with the Indians, see JX 162, pp. 42-45. A subsequent report of 
McLaughlin, summarizing his meetings with the Utes, can be found 
at LD 101, pp. 9-12. 
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Department of Interior had not been able to complete surveys of 
reservation land in order to make the allotments, so that the 
excess lands could in turn be ascertained and restored to the 
public domain. This delay prompted the Senate, on February 4, 
1905, to demand an explanation from the Secretary of the Interior 
as to why he apparently was not going to meet the March 10 dead-
line (see LD 101 at p. 1). The Secretary reported promptly, 
under date of February 15, 1905, setting forth the progress that 
had been made, and explaining, inter alia, that the Department 
had experienced difficulty in completing land surveys so that 
allotments could be made and this had prevented a timely comple-
tion of the allotment program. He thus made clear the need for 
an extension of time in which to complete the allotment program. 
Accordingly, by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048), 
Congress extended the effective date for terminating the reserva-
tion from March 10, 1905, to September 1, 1905. The Act provided 
in relevant part: 
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such 
tracts as may have been set aside as national 
forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were dis-
posed of by the act of Congress of May twenty-
seventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be dis-
posed of under the general provisions of the home-
stead and town-site laws of the United States, and 
shall be opened to settlement and entry by procla-
mation of the President, which proclamation shall 
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be 
settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons en-
titled to make entry thereof; • . . 
That before the opening of the Uintah Indian Reser-
vation the President is hereby authorized to set 
apart and reserve as an addition to the Uintah 
Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and 
regulations governing forest reserves, and subject 
to the mineral rights granted by the act of Con-
gress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and 
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two, such portions of the lands within the Uintah 
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and 
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir 
site or other lands necessary to conserve and pro* 
tect the water supply for the Indians or for 
general agricultural development, and may confirm 
such rights to water thereon as have already ac-
crued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber 
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior 
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty, 
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with 
the provisions of the act opening the reservation. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
•• The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts 
The en banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33 
Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902 
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain. 
Compare Ute Indian Tribef 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12 
(Seth, J., dissenting). That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-
ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding 
circumstances. 
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the 
"public domain91 language of the 1902 Act. Rather, the 1905 Act 
contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be dis-
posed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and town-
site laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by 
proclamation of the President." But the 1905 Act did not purport 
to change whether there should be a disestablishment. That had 
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act. The 1905 Act merely 
addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing dises-
tablishment. There is no conflict or inconsistency between the 
two. 
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The provision in the 1905 Act that the surplus lands were to 
be disposed of under the homestead and townsite provisions of the 
public land laws certainly does not constitute a restriction to 
the declaration in the 1902 Act that the lands were to be re-
stored to the public domain. The intent of the 1902 Act was car-
ried over into the 1905 Act. 
The circumstances surrounding the Uintah reservation opening 
are similar in many respects to those in Rosebud, supra, where 
the Supreme Court found there to be a diminishment of reservation 
boundaries. In Rosebud, the Court held that the operative lan-
guage of the original act demonstrated "an unmistakable baseline 
purpose of disestablishment'* (430 U.S. at 592) even though the 
opening of the reservation was actually implemented by subsequent 
legislation. The same is true for the Uintah reservation legis-
lation in that each later act merely builds on the original act 
and deals primarily with extending the time for opening.li/ 
The legislative history of the 1905 Act, however, demon-
strates that Congress was implementing, not abandoning, the 1902 
Act's baseline purpose to end the Uintah reservation. Compare S. 
Rep. No. 4240, 58th Cong., 3d Sees., at 14-16 (1905) (letters of 
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs and the General Land Office) 
with Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112 (Seth, J., dissenting) 
(N[n]othing in the Congressional debates suggests an attempt to 
26. On this point, the Tenth Circuit's en banc decision is 
contrary to its views as expressed in Hanson v. U.S., 153 F.2d 
162 (10th Cir. 1946), where it was concluded that the 1905 Act 
merely extended the date of opening and did not alter or affect 
the operative terms of the 1902 Act. 
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change the 1902 intent. . . " ) . See also, debates at 39 Cong. 
Rec. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103). 
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other 
than a speedy conclusion of the allotment process) was that land 
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land. 
See "Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD 
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there 
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry was to 
keep the reservation intact. To the contrary, the pertinent dis-
cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would 
still be restored to the public domain. Senator Teller, one of 
the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings: 
••I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land 
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at 
30) (emphasis added). Further, there is nothing in the congres-
sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended 
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uin-
tah reservation. 
The real purpose and intent of the 1905 Act was not only to 
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public do-
main as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and 
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite 
laws in order to prevent speculation. Limitations on entry such 
as those contained in the 1905 Act are not inconsistent with the 
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands 
to the public domain and disestablish the reservation. Again, 
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the cumulative series of acts in this case can be compared to 
those in Rosebud where the Supreme Court held there to be a 
disestablishment. Rosebud at 592. 
That the 1905 Act carried the 1902 Act into effect is further 
clearly demonstrated by the Presidential Proclamation opening the 
original Uintah reservation for entry and settlement. The Presi-
dential Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), employing 
much the same format as that used in the 1904 Rosebud Proclama-
tion, provided: 
Whereas it was provided by the Act of Congress, 
approved May 27, . . . 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among 
other things, that on October first, 1903, the un-
allotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in 
the State of Utah, "shall be restored to the public 
domain: • . . •" 
And, whereas, the time for the opening of said 
unallotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904, 
by the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1903 (32 
Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10, 1905, by 
the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1904 (33 
Stat., 207), and was again extended to not later 
than September 1, 1905, by the Act of Congress, 
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), which last 
named act provided, among other things: 
[The Act is here quoted] 
Now, therefore, I . . . do hereby declare • • • 
that all the unallotted lands in said reservation, 
excepting such as have at that time been reserved 
• • ., and such mineral lands as may have been 
disposed of . . ., will on and after the 28th day 
of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter pre-
scribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry, 
settlement, and disposition under the general pro* 
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the 
United States. . . . 
34 Stat, at 3119-20 (emphasis added). 
The President thus clearly understood that the 1905 Act was 
implementing—not deviating from—the purpose of disestablishment 
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underlying the 1902 Act. The 1905 Proclamation is similar to the 
one involved in Rosebud and constitutes an "unambiguous, contem-
poraneous, statement, by the Nation9s Chief Executive of a per-
ceived disestablishment* • •" (Id,, 430 U.S. at 602-03), and 
unmistakably reflects the intent of Congress. See id. at 603. 
On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent. 
3. Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment 
In addition to examining the legislation opening a 
reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component 
of its "fairly clean analytical structure11 is to examine the 
subsequent history of the area: 
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized 
that who actually moved onto opened reservation 
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a 
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where 
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion 
of a reservation and the area has long since lost 
its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de 
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have oc-
curred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 
at 588, n 3, and 604-605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct 
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at 
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to 
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to 
de facto diminishment, we look to the subsequent 
demographic history of opened lands as one addi-
tional clue as to what Congress expected would hap-
pen once land on a particular reservation was 
opened to non-Indian settlers. 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
The Court further noted that: 
When an area is predominately populated by non-
Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian 
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian 
Country seriously burdens the administration of 
State and local governments. 
Solem at 471, n.12. 
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In Rosebud, the Court stated: 
The fact that neither Congress nor the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs has sought to exercise its 
authority over this area, or to challenge the 
State's exercise of authority, is a factor entitled 
to weight as a part of the "jurisdictional his-
tory.11 The long-standing assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the State over an area that is over 90% 
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not 
only demonstrates the parties9 understanding of the 
meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable 
expectations which should not be upset by so 
strained a reading of the Acts. . . 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. We will now briefly examine several 
additional factors which strongly support disestablishment. 
a. Subsequent Administrative and Congressional 
Recognition of Termination 
The 1905 Presidential Proclamation, discussed 
supra, which opened the reservation, does not stand alone in its 
reference that the surplus lands were restored to the public do-
main. The understanding of other responsible government offi-
cials has, until recent years, consistently mirrored President 
Roosevelt9s construction.22/ Many of the documents cited in the 
27. See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to the Secretary of Interior, dated May 11, 1905, at 3 
(JX 463)? Letter of the Acting Secretary of Interior, dated Sep-
tember 3, 1909; Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office to Senator Reed Smoot, dated December 20, 1909; Letter of 
the Secretary of Interior to Senator Reed Smoot, dated January 
12, 1911; H.R. Doc. No. 892, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912) 
(Joint Report of Inspector James McLaughlin and the Chief Super-
visor) ; H.R. Doc. No. 1250, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at 1-2 (1914) 
(Letter of the Secretary); Letter of the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated 
September 2B, 1922, at 1 (JX 403); Letter of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated December 1, 1927, at 2; 54 I.D. 559, 561-62 
(1934) (JX 431); Solicitor Opinion M-33626, at 2 (August 3, 
1944); Secretarial Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 12409 (1945) (LD 183); 59 
I.D. 393 (1947); Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 1-2, 5 (December 
7, 1950); Appeal of Edward M. Brown, A-26523, at 1-2 (December 
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margin expressly recognize that, with respect to the original 
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands were re-
stored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act. 
The record shows as well that officials of the Interior Depart-
ment treated the original Uintah reservation as having been 
disestablished. Thus, with the opening of the reservation in 
1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the 
original area as the "former" reservation. For decades after the 
opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the 
trust lands (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the 
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status) 
as the Tribe's existing reservation,11/ a practice that continued 
until recently.22/ 
27. (Cont'd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Gonsales, at 1 
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920 
(1971) (LD 210). 
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1, 
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the 
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc. 
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of 
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the 
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 6 6 
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior). 
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Ass't. Attorney General). 
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S. 
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the 
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah & 
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Grazing Report, at 1, 3 
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual 
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior); 
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations 
in Arizona, Nevada t Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 480). 
Subsequent legislation and other congressional materials are 
to the same effect.12/ Numerous congressional documents subse-
quent to the 1905 opening contain references to the "former" 
reservation. See for example, Senate Report No. 219, 61st Cong. 
2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1910 (LD 138) entitled "Making Available Lands 
On Former Uintah Indian Reservation," (emphasis added).12/ 
It should be noted that these numerous and repeated referen-
ces in congressional documents vere consistent with the policy of 
the day of disestablishing Indian reservations and assimilating 
the Indians into society. 
30. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 196; S. Rep. 
No. 139, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 291, 
59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); S. Rep. No. 893, 62d Cong., 
2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 943, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 
at 1-2 (1912); S. Rep. No. 979, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2 
(1926); H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1927); 
and 74 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1931). Characteristic of Congress' 
treatment is the Act of July 20, 1912, which provided that: 
any person who has heretofore made a homestead entry for 
land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian 
Reservation in the State of Utah, authorized by the Act 
approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, 
and Acts amendatory thereto. . . . 
37 Stat. 196 (emphasis added). See also Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 
603, n.25. 
31. For other past tense references to the "former" reserva-
tion, see; Congressional Floor Debates, Jan. 15, 1906, p. 1064 
(LD 116); Senate Bill 321, Jan. 27, 1906 (LD 120); H.R. Rep. No. 
823, Feb. 9, 1906 (LD 122); S. Rep. No. 2561—Indian Appropria-
tions Bill, p. 131, April 13, 1906 (LD 124); S. Rep. No. 4263, 
June 12, 1906 (LD 126); Public Law 258 (H.R. 15331, pp. 375-76) 
June 21, 1906 (LD 127); H.R. Rep. No. 5010, June 25, 1906 (LD 
128); Senate Bill 6375 (P.L. 345) June 29, 1906 (LD 129); P.L. 
104—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 95, April 30, 1908 (LD 135); 
P.L. 144—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 285, April 4, 1910 (LD 
139); P.L. 434—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 1074, March 31, 
1911 (LD 141); P.L. 717, 70 Stat. 546, 548, July 14, 1956 (LD 
203). 
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Judicial pronouncements also follow suit. In decisions ren-
dered prior to Ute Indian Tribe, the courts interpreted the 1905 
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.21/ In-
deed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v. 
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc 
majority—that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original 
Uintah reservation were "restored to the public domain by the Act 
of May 27, 1902. . . ." Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court 
likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to 
the public domain under these Acts. Sowards, 108 P. at 1114. 
Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that the Tribe's reservation was considered to be only 
those lands held in trust by the federal government. Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972). 
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation 
remains intact, the en banc majority has created what must be one 
of the few—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a na-
tional forest. The district court and the panel of the court of 
appeals agreed that such an anomaly was not intended and that the 
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048, 
1069-70, which set aside more than 1 million acres "as an addi-
tion to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the laws, rules and 
regulations governing forest reserves,19 thereby diminished the 
32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah 
and White River Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 & 21-22; 
United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and 
Sowards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910). 
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original Uintah reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313-
14. The en banc Majority thought, incorrectly, that under Solem 
the transfer of the administration of these one million acres 
from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture and 
the fact that Congress later compensated the Tribe for its inter-
est in the forest lands were not inconsistent with continued 
reservation status. Despite the fact, as the federal district 
court stated, that the "status and purpose of national forest 
lands are distinct from the status and purpose of Indian reserva-
tions" (Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp at 1138), the en banc 
majority apparently believed that under Solea this could be ig-
nored and that the Tribe therefore had jurisdiction within the 
national forest (Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090). There is, 
however, nothing in the Court's Solem opinion that justifies such 
an extraordinary result. Congress clearly ended the original 
Uintah reservation on the land withdrawn for a national forest, 
which further demonstrates its intent to disestablish the reser-
vation itself. 
The United States supported the Ute Tribe as amicus curiae in 
the recent federal litigation with respect to the Uintah reserva-
tion. In so doing, the United States failed to acknowledge the 
inconsistency of that position with its position in other litiga-
tion involving this reservation. In Uintah and White River Bands 
of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1 (1957), it entered 
into a stipulation with which the Court of Claims agreed (139 
Ct.Cl. at 5-6, 22) which quoted the 1902 Act and then succinctly 
stated the critical point: "Pursuant to this [1902] Act and 
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amendments thereto, . . . allotments in severalty . • • • were 
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands . . 
• • were restored to the public domain, and opened for disposi-
tion under the public land laws for the benefit of the Indians11 
(emphasis added). What is more, the United States (and the Utes) 
consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah 
reservation was a former reservation; and throughout its opinion 
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uin-
tah reservation as having ended. E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28, 
56, 64, 69 and 70. It is also worthy of note that when the Ute 
Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it 
up well: "Nov, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of 
particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as 
amended under which the Uintah Reservation was ultimately broken 
up."22/ 
b. Subsequent Demographic History Supports 
Disestablishment 
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-
strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially 
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the 
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but 
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local govern-
ments in a myriad of areas. The disputed area "lost its Indian 
character" long ago. It is "predominantly populated by non-
33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and 
White River Band of Utes v. U.S., No. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims 
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954). 
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Indians," approximately 18,000 of them,11/ with only about 1,500 
tribal members, who are living mainly on trust lands. Ute Indian 
Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., dissenting). The non-Indians 
are the ones "who actually moved onto the opened reservation 
lands99 and have been there ever since. Thus, there has indeed 
been a de facto or de jure disestablishment. It is their "jus-
tifiable expectations," built up over a 60-year period, that 
would be upset if it were to be held that the original boundaries 
are still intact and it is their interests the en banc majority 
ignored, despite the United States Supreme Court's command that 
such factors must be taken into account. E.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S. 
at 605; and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
Under the en banc majority9s result, the Ute Tribe would pre-
side over an area owned and predominantly populated by non-
Indians and, hence, in which the Tribe has little presence and no 
real interest as a sovereign. At the same time, State and local 
authority would be significantly limited despite the fact that 
this area has principally been the concern and responsibility of 
these governments, not the Tribe. This would include increased 
tribal court jurisdiction over all residents of the area, and 
diminished state court jurisdiction. 
The testimony and exhibits introduced in the federal district 
court clearly establish that the State and its local governmental 
divisions had exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic 
34. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General 
Population Characteristics Utah, Table 15, p. 46-12 (1980). 
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reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust 
lands. The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area 
shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White 
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic 
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the 
lavs of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding 
trust lands).15/ For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-
intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 380), it 
was stated as follows: 
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of 
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present 
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction 
over their persons. Where offences have been com-
mitted against the laws of the State, the matter 
has been reported to the County authorities and the 
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with 
the County authorities in the maintenance of law 
and order. 
Id. at 2-3. Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that 
the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area beginning in the early 1900's.l§/ 
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional 
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State 
and local officials introduced at the federal district court tri-
al. This testimony shows that until recently the State continued 
35. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380 
at 2; JX 386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399 
at 2; JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420. 
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian 
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the 
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX 
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78 
(testimony of George Marett, Sheriff of Duchesne County). 
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to exercise primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area, except on the trust lands.22/ 
The evidence introduced in this case regarding the exercise 
of jurisdictional authority by the Tribe also confirms that the 
State and local governmental subdivisions have, until recently, 
exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area, except on the trust lands.25/ 
Finally, until recently the Ute Tribe itself treated only the 
trust lands as the Tribe's post-1905 reservation.22/ As the dis-
sent in Ute Indian Tribe observed: 
Statements made by the Utes themselves also tend to de-
tract from their position. For example, the 1957 Ute 
Ten Year Development Program provides a description of 
the total acreage of the Uintah and Ouray reservation as 
currently containing 1,010,000 acres. . . . 
773 F.2d at 1114. 
37. See Trial Tr. at 106 (testimony of Clair Huff, Utah Di-
vision of Wildlife Resources); 121 (testimony of Norman Hancock, 
Division of Wildlife Resources); 158*59 (testimony of David 
Thomas, Division of Wildlife Resources); 186-87 (testimony of 
Edward Tuttle, Utah Division of Parks and Recreation); 220 (tes-
timony of Donald Smith, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 251 
(testimony of C. Blake Feight, Utah Division of Oil, Gas 6 
Mining); 267, 270-74, 277-79 and 281-89 (testimony of George 
Marett, Duchesne County Sheriff); and 298-99 (testimony of Ray 
Wardle, member and Chief of Tribal Police, cross-deputized by 
Uintah County)• 
38. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 121 and 135 (testimony of Norman 
Hancock); 159 (testimony of David Thomas); 174 (testimony of Gor-
don Harms ton, Utah Department of Natural Resources) ,* 187 (tes-
timony of Edward Tuttle); 228 (testimony of Charles East); 251 
(testimony of C. Blake Feight); 262-63 (testimony of Alfred Par-
riette, Tribe's Division of Wildlife Management and Lav Enforce-
ment) ; and 294-300 (testimony of Ray Wardle). 
39. See, e.g., 1957 Ute Ten-Year Development Program, at 66-
68 (JX 465); 1966 Review and Revision of the Uintah & Ouray 
Indian Reservation-Wide Program, at 7, 8; and 1969 Annual Report 
of the Uintah Indian Tribe, at 1 (JX 473). 
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Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs 
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that 
they were entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.w 
These signs were clearly intended to designate what the Tribe 
thought were the reservation boundaries. The signs have been 
replaced from time to tine over the years (with the signs in more 
recent tines being more elaborate), but they have always indi-
cated that the boundaries of the trust lands were the reservation 
boundaries.12/ 
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the 
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional 
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dis-
pute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and 
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians, 
and has lost its Indian character virtually from the opening of 
the reservation in 1905. 
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States 
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the con-
clusion must be that the reservation was disestablished and the 
surplus lands which were restored to the public domain are not 
part of the reservation—nor do they constitute Indian country as 
40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr. 
155-57) and Gordon Harmston (Tr. 176-77). A series of photo-
graphs of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such 
signs appeared on March 22, 1977, were introduced at trial as Ex. 
I-4B, coordinated with Ex. 1-4A, indicating the precise locations 
where the various photographs were taken. 
defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151. Therefore, the state district court 
had jurisdiction in this Matter. 
II• PERANK*S INDIAN STATUS 
18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 preclude state criminal 
jurisdiction over "Indians19 who commit crimes within Indian coun-
try. 11/ However, these statutes do not provide a specific defi-
nition of who is an Indian. Perank asserts that he is an Indian, 
and contends that Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitutionll/ 
recognizes membership in the Tribe as including all children born 
to any resident member of the Tribe.il/ 
Perank submitted two affidavits below from his father and 
mother (R. 69*72), which alleged that Perank1s father is a full-
blooded Indian enrolled as a member of the Ute Tribe, that his 
mother has some Indian blood, and that Perank was born in 
Roosevelt while the family was residing on the reservation. The 
record also contains a copy of Perank9s birth certificate (R. 
76), and those of other Perank family members (R. 73-75). 
As the moving party challenging the court's jurisdiction, 
Perank carries the initial burden of producing sufficient 
evidence, beyond mere suppositions or allegations, to establish a 
41. As already shown above, the crime here was not committed 
in Indian country so Perankfs Indian status is irrelevant. 
42. It appears this Court can take judicial notice of the 
Tribal Constitution. See Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. 
43. The Ute tribal courts have also adopted this interpreta-
tion of the tribal constitution. See Chapoose v. Ute Tribal 
Business Committee, Ute Tribal Appellate Court, Civil No. 133-77 
(1981). 
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